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Countering Islamophobia: Muslim participation in multifaith networks
Anna Halafoff*
School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
In recent years a heightened awareness of global risks has produced an unprecedented interest
in global peace and security initiatives. This article discusses the impact of international crisis
events on religiously diverse communities in Australia, in particular rising Islamophobia,
migrantophobia and attacks on multiculturalism. Religious communities have been far from
passive in their responses to the impact of these events, initiating dialogue and educational
activities to dispel negative stereotypes and attitudes. In addition, state actors, including
police, have prioritized engagement with religious leaders, and this has resulted in a rise of
state supported multifaith peacebuilding activities. The article argues that, in response to
global risks of terror and exclusion, multifaith movements and multi-actor networks,
including religious leaders, state actors, educators and the media, have the potential to
advance common security. In response to conflicts both local and global, these examples of
cooperation between religious and non-religious actors in Australia can be instructive to
other increasingly multifaith societies.
Keywords: Muslims; Islamophobia; multifaith; peacebuilding; counter-terrorism
Introduction
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, Aus-
tralian Muslims experienced an increase in discrimination and attacks against them and their
places of worship. A culture of fear, perpetuated by discourses of exclusion that emanated
from the former Prime Minister John Howard’s government, also contributed to rising Islamopho-
bia, migrantophobia and critiques of multiculturalism. However, Muslim communities were far
from passive in their responses to the impact of these events, and initiated multifaith and edu-
cational activities to dispel negative stereotypes and attitudes propagated by the media and pol-
itical figures. The State Government of Victoria and Victoria Police also supported multifaith
and multi-actor peacebuilding initiatives and prioritized engagement with Muslim leaders and
communities as part of their social inclusion and community building strategies (Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2004, 43–62; Cahill et al. 2004, 84–5; Halafoff
2006, 9–12; Bouma et al. 2007, 5–6, 22–6, 43–60, 65–8). Indeed, the Victorian Government
placed multiculturalism and a commitment to working in partnership with culturally and reli-
giously diverse communities at the heart of its counter-terrorism policies (State Government of
Victoria 2005, 3).
A rise in multifaith engagement also occurred in the USA after the events of 11 September (9/
11) (Eck 2001, xiii–xix; Brodeur 2005, 42; McCarthy 2007, 85; Niebuhr 2008, xxii, 5–7, 10–11)
and the number of multifaith and multi-actor peacebuilding networks, including both religious
and state actors, also increased in the UK as a result of 9/11 and the London bombings on 7
and 21 July 2005 (Braybrooke 2007, 1, 13; Pearce, quoted in Bharat and Bharat 2007, 245–6).
These twenty-first century developments form part of a long history of multifaith initiatives
that considerably predate the events of 9/11. The first Parliament of the World’s Religions
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(PWR),1 held in Chicago in 1893, is commonly described as the beginning of the multifaith
movement, and the second PWR,2 held in Chicago 100 years later, as signifying the movement’s
‘coming of age’ (Braybrooke 1992, 7–8). Global multifaith engagement, particularly multifaith
engagement in the USA, expanded dramatically in the 1990s well before 9/11. This was evi-
denced by the 1993 PWR and the formation of a number of major multifaith organizations
(Eck 2001, 370; Kirkwood 2007, xiv). As Marc Gopin stated at the turn of the twenty-first
century:
while the fractionating character of religious revivalism is more noticeable and sometimes more
violent, there is a quiet revolution in integration taking place as well … never before in history …
have so many leaders and adherents been inspired to work for a truly inclusive vision that is multi-
cultural and multireligious. (Gopin 2000, 4)
While Diana L. Eck (2005, 21–6) described initial fears that 9/11 would provide a ‘cataclysmic
setback’ to multifaith relations, it had the opposite effect of becoming a stimulus for multifaith
movements, particularly in Western societies (Eck 2001, xiii–xix; Bouma et al. 2007, 61–7; Kirk-
wood 2007, v–vi; Niebuhr 2008, 5–7, 10–11). In addition, as described above, since 9/11 state
actors in Australia and the UK have increasingly initiated and supported multifaith activities
with a focus on social inclusion and countering radicalization (Brodeur 2005, 42; Halafoff
2006, 11–12; 2007; Bouma et al. 2007, 69–74, 111–12; Braybrooke 2007, 1, 13; Bouma 2008,
13; Weller 2008, 198–9). Thus, religious peacebuilding efforts in Western societies including
the USA, the UK and Australia have, in line with Cynthia Sampson’s (1997, 304) prediction,
become ‘increasingly intentional and systematic’ in response to this crisis event.
While the growth of social movements confronting the global issues of human rights, peace,
social justice and sustainability from the 1960s onward has been extensively documented in the
sociological literature, multifaith movements remain hardly mentioned (Beckford 2003, 109,
138). According to James A. Beckford, modern and ultramodern sociological studies of religion
have tended ‘to emphasise marginal, deviant or sensational aspects of religion and show relatively
little interest in the “normal” range of religious beliefs, actions and organisations’ (ibid., 127). In
particular, sociologists have been preoccupied with studies of fundamentalism and how these
movements, while critical of the global spread of capitalism, have used some of the advances
of globalization (such as global communication systems) to their advantage (ibid., 127, 115).
Therefore, Beckford challenges sociologists of religion ‘to demonstrate that globalisation … is
still associated with interesting aspects of religion other than fundamentalism’ and suggests the
growth of interfaith networks as one such under-researched example (ibid., 136, 138). He cites
Richard H. Roberts’s (2002) account of the 1993 PWR as evidence of the search among religious
organizations for ‘common ground’ as a way to deal collectively with threats and problems such
as poverty, gender inequity, environmental degradation and human rights abuses (Beckford 2003,
109–10).
In 2006, in my doctoral research study titled ‘Netpeace: multifaith movements and common
security’ (Halafoff 2010), I took up Beckford’s challenge – to investigate how multifaith
movements were countering global risks in Western societies. In order to develop a greater under-
standing of multifaith movements’ peacebuilding role in ultramodernity, I chose to conduct a
qualitative, sociological study consisting of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with expert
professionals in the field of multifaith relations in the USA, the UK and Australia.3 A letter of
invitation was sent by email to 74 possible participants. Additional participants were invited
through a ‘snowballing technique’, in which participants forwarded invitations to experts
whom they thought might also be interested in participating in the study. An overwhelmingly
positive response to invitations resulted in a total of 54 semi-structured interviews being con-
ducted throughout 2007–2008, 18 in Australia, 11 in the UK and 23 in the US, with 30 men,
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22 women and including eight young people. Interviews were recorded on an iPod as MP3 files
and transcribed, either professionally or by me, into Word files. I then manually coded the data
thematically using the qualitative data analysis program NVIVO. As all participants consented
to having their comments identified, respondents’ remarks were tagged including the actor’s
surname, the year of the interview and the country in which the participant resided, e.g. <Patel
2007, USA>.
The Netpeace study did not focus primarily on Muslim communities, but rather on multifaith
movements more generally. However, as the field research was conducted between 2007–2008,
Muslim communities were frequently at the centre of multifaith activities as a result of events
such as 9/11, and the bombings in 2002 in Bali and in 2005 in London, in which Muslim extre-
mists had committed acts of terrorism against non-Muslim and Muslim civilians. A rise in Isla-
mophobia certainly occurred in Western societies at these times and multifaith initiatives and
multi-actor peacebuilding networks, including state actors and Muslim community leaders,
were increasingly implemented to counter negative stereotypes and as peacebuilding initiatives
in Australia, the UK and the US. In this article, I present the findings of the Netpeace study con-
cerned specifically with Muslim engagement in multifaith activities. While there was a significant
increase in Muslim participation in multifaith movements following the events of 9/11, this needs
to be contextualized within a broader history of multifaith movements, and particularly the rise of
Muslim engagement in multifaith activities in the 1990s, which prepared the ground for the multi-
faith response to 9/11. I argue that, in response to global risks of terror and exclusion, multifaith
movements and multi-actor networks, including religious leaders and state actors, have the
potential to advance common security in increasingly multifaith societies.
The 1893 Parliament of the World’s Religions
The 1893 PWR is widely acknowledged as the beginning of the global multifaith movement
(Braybrooke 1992, 7–8). It was held as part of a World Columbian Exposition celebrating Chris-
topher Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of America and has been widely and rightly criticized as a flawed
model of multifaith relations due to its Christian bias and ‘civilizing mission’ (Braybrooke 1992,
8–9, 18, 27, 39–42). However, the conflicting aims of the 1893 PWR are well illustrated in the
divergent attitudes of its organizers. While Rev. John Henry Barrows advocated a Christian
Dominionist agenda by marking the PWR as ‘a new era of Christian triumph’ (Barrows 1893,
1581, quoted in Braybrooke 1992, 15), Charles Carroll Bonney and Rev. Jenkin Lloyd Jones
intended for the PWR to emphasize the ‘common essentials of all religions’ and shared a
genuine wish to develop interreligious understanding (Bonney 1894, 73–8, quoted in Braybrooke
1992, 12–13).
The international gathering of the 1893 PWR was made possible by increased opportunities
for travel and communication, which continued to escalate throughout the twentieth century, thus
further enabling the global expansion of multifaith movements (Braybrooke 1992, 22, 309). A
number of Jewish leaders participated in the 1893 PWR and this established a tradition of ecume-
nical relations among Catholics, Protestants and Jews in America (ibid., 29–30). In addition, due
to the spread of the British Empire throughout Asia, a fascination with Eastern philosophy was
prevalent in Western societies in the late nineteenth century (Croucher 1989, 6–10; Braybrooke
1996, 10; McCarthy 2007, 15). While Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and the
Theosophical Society had all been influential in introducing Americans to Hindu and Buddhist
thought, the 1893 PWR provided the first opportunity for Americans to have direct contact
with Hindu and Buddhist teachers from India, Sri Lanka and Japan (Eck 2001, 96–7, 180–85).
These teachers, in addition to providing first-hand explanations of their religious and philosophi-
cal traditions, utilized the PWR as a platform to challenge Christian Dominionism and exclusivity
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propagated by British and American missionaries. The Indian Swami Vivekananda, in particular,
questioned the PWR’s ‘Christian triumphantalism’ (Braybrooke 1992, 25).
Although invited, the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul refused to sendMuslim representatives to the
first PWR. The only Muslim participant was the American, Mohammed Russell Alexander Webb,
who had converted to Islam while posted as America’s consul general in the Philippines. Webb
publicly acknowledged the negative stereotypes associated with Islam in America yet also articu-
lated his confidence that, once Americans had a true understanding of Islam, they would learn to
appreciate it (Eck 2001, 234–5). Webb’s singular Muslim presence at the 1893 PWR clearly illus-
trates that the first bridges to be built in global multifaith engagement were largely among Hindus,
Buddhists, Jews and Christians. Moreover, Indigenous people were excluded from the main
assembly of the 1893 PWR (Brodeur 2005, 44) and it was not until a century later that Indigenous
and Muslim participants began to play a prominent role in multifaith movements in Western
societies.
Despite its many flaws, the 1893 PWR established ‘a normative model’ for multifaith encoun-
ters conducted in a spirit of openness and respect for diversity, with a new emphasis on non-pro-
selytizing and on promoting understanding between faith traditions (McCarthy 2007, 18; Brodeur
2005, 43). As Swami Vivekananda stated at the conclusion of the first PWR:
The Parliament of Religions has proved to the world that holiness, purity and charity are not the exclu-
sive possessions of any church in the world, and that every system has produced men and women of
the most exalted character. (Quoted in Bharat and Bharat 2007, 5)
The 1893 PWR Declaration emphasized the need for more understanding between religions,
but also the need for common action in response to social ‘problems … and questions connected
with Temperance, Labour, Education, Wealth and Poverty’ and to ‘bring nations of the earth into a
more friendly fellowship in the hope of securing permanent international peace’ (Barrows 1893,
18, quoted in Braybrooke 1992, 324). This commitment to peacebuilding within multifaith move-
ments strengthened after World War II.
The 1990s and the rise of multifaith movements
While the multifaith movement continued to expand globally throughout the twentieth century,
particularly in response to crisis events such as the Holocaust and the nuclear bombing of Hir-
oshima and Nagasaki, and the global risk of climate change, it wasn’t until the 1990s that
Muslim communities began to play a central role in global multifaith initiatives.
There is no doubt that the 1990s were a time of increased multifaith activity evident in the
renewal and/or foundation of many of the world’s largest multifaith organizations, including
the United Religions Initiative (URI), the Interfaith Network of New York (IFNY), the Tanen-
baum Centre (TC) and the Parliament of the World’s Religions (PWR) (Kirkwood 2007, xiv;
Eck 2001, 370). It is also important to note that a new emphasis on youth engagement developed
within the multifaith movement in the 1990s, evident in a rise of youth programmes within the
major multifaith organizations and the creation of the specifically youth-oriented multifaith
organization the Interfaith Youth Core (IFYC), founded in 1999 by the young American
Muslim leader Eboo Patel (Brodeur and Patel 2006, 4; Bharat and Bharat 2007, 190).
In 1988, the leading global multifaith organizations formed the International Interfaith Organ-
isations’ Coordinating Committee to begin planning the 1993 centenary of the 1893 PWR (Bharat
and Bharat 2007, 102). In 1993, over 7,000 people from diverse faith traditions, including
Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Taoists,
Wiccans, Baha’is and Indigenous peoples from all over the world, assembled in Chicago to
participate in the PWR (Eck 2001, 366–8). Whereas the 1893 PWR was seen as the beginning
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of the global multifaith movement, the 1993 PWR is said to have signified its ‘coming of age’
(Braybrooke 1992, 7–8). Participants in the Netpeace study affirmed this assertion by citing
the 1993 PWR as the real beginning of a global multifaith movement <Knitter 2007, USA;
Patel 2007, USA>, in so far as this event raised the profile <Braybrooke 2007, UK> and visibility
<Gibbs 2007, USA> of international multifaith engagement.
However, the euphoria and optimism of this period, epitomized by the global gathering of
religious leaders at the 1993 Parliament, was soon to be overshadowed by other international
events. Alongside the rise of non-violent social movements, including the women’s, environ-
mental and multifaith movements, in the later part of the twentieth century, after the end of
the Cold War, a series of ‘new wars’ erupted in which the new actors were not states, but
rather cultural and/or religious movements claiming power based on identity politics (Kaldor
1999, 1–2, 6). While an increased awareness of interconnectedness enabled by processes of
globalization created a perception of ‘oneness’ among an emerging global citizenry, it also
heightened differences, thereby threatening ontological security (ibid., 2–4, 6; Beckford 2003,
109). Growing fears around losing identity and power resulted in a global reassertion of
‘introverted forms of nationalism’, of ethnic and religious identities, fostering aggressive
intolerances (Beck 2006, 4, emphasis original). As a result, a global resurgence of religion
and a rise of religious fundamentalisms categorized the turn of the twenty-first century
(Marty and Appleby 1992). The fifth World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP)
Assembly declaration of 1989 foresaw these events by ending with the words: ‘“Lead us
from fear to trust”. Lead us from common terror to common security’ (WCRP 1989, 4,
quoted in Braybrooke 1992, 156). This statement reflected both growing concerns regarding
the global rise of religious extremism and the recognition that religions could play a positive
role in countering religiously motivated violence.
Muslim communities and crisis events in the 1990s
In addition, as Muslim communities were frequently at the centre of crisis events in the late 1980s
and 1990s, such as the ‘The satanic verses controversy’ in the UK and the First Gulf War, a rise in
Islamophobia, fomented by divisive discourses emanating from state actors and the media, spread
throughout Western societies during this period (Weller 2008, 155, 163–7, 194–5; Eck 2001, 2, 8,
296–300, 303, 306). As a result, Muslim communities became proactive in countering negative
stereotypes, often through multifaith activities, and new multifaith alliances were formed
especially between Christians, Muslims and Jews (Eck 2001, 341–7, 374; Bharat and Bharat
2007, 236).
In the UK, The satanic verses controversy, also known as ‘the Rushdie affair’, brought to the
fore rising tensions about the privileges granted to Christianity over other religions in the UK. The
satanic verses controversy highlighted the fact that Islam and other religions were not included in
the blasphemy laws and Muslims consequently campaigned for their extension. Following The
satanic verses controversy, multiculturalism and its policies became the subject of frequent
attack and debate in the UK and internationally. Furthermore, a rise in discrimination against
and harassment of Muslims was recorded in the UK during the 1990s. Hindus, Sikhs, Pagans
and members of New Religious Movements also frequently reported incidents of discrimination
and hostility towards them (Weller 2008, 155, 163–7, 186–7, 194–5). In Australia, a backlash
against multiculturalism and a rise in xenophobia also unfolded in the 1990s, as evidenced by
the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party and John Howard’s narrow nationalism (Jayaraman
2000, 151).
Similar developments occurred in the USA. A lack of awareness about and a resistance to an
increasingly plural religious America contributed to the growth of conservative Christian groups
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such as the Moral Majority and Christian Coalition, who invoked the exclusive language of a
‘Christian America’ in the public sphere (Eck 2001, 2). Many Americans felt threatened by
pluralism, as is evident in the publication of books such as Peter Brimelow’s Alien nation and
Arthur Schlesinger Jnr’s The disuniting of America (ibid., 29). As Eck describes, a ‘deep-
seated contradiction’ arose in American minds between ‘the coexistence of a commitment to
religious liberty’ and the ‘deep structures of Christian entitlement and ideological Christian
exclusivism’ (ibid., 46). During the 1990s, there were a significant number of attacks against
Muslims and mosques and also against other religious communities such as Sikhs, Hindus and
Buddhists throughout the USA, as religious minorities became the most easily identifiable
subjects of peoples’ fears and prejudices, and thus objects of hostility. These fears were
exacerbated by a steady stream of negative media images, full of denigrating stereotypes such
as ‘Sikh militant’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalist’. In addition, subsequent to the 1995 Oklahoma
City bombings, for which the media initially falsely blamed Muslims, Islamic centres and
Muslim women, men, youths and children were targeted in a spate of backlash attacks against
Muslim communities. The Oklahoma City events have been described as a turning point for
Muslim communities in America, as they became conscious of their increasing vulnerability
(ibid., 8, 296–300, 303, 306).
As a result of these events, diverse faith communities joined together with Muslim commu-
nities to show solidarity and joint outrage in response to these hate crimes. Solidarity among faith
communities was also evident following attacks on Jewish, Hindu and Sikh communities in the
USA in the 1990s (ibid., 341–7). Eck describes how post-crisis multifaith initiatives, such as the
interreligious service held by Washington’s InterFaith Conference after the 1994 Hebron mas-
sacre, ‘proved the importance of these networks of trust’, as ‘[w]ithout a fifteen-year history of
interfaith cooperation, this would have been unthinkable’ (ibid., 373). ‘[H]aving such bridges
of trust in place is essential’, writes Eck, ‘for when the water rises it is often too late to create
them’ (ibid., 373). Eck also argues that ‘[t]he chasms opened by hate crimes can become the
sites of new bridge building’ (ibid., 343). New alliances of Jews, Christians and Muslims also
formed in response to the Gulf War (ibid., 374) and the Three Faiths Forum (TFF), promoting
understanding and respect between Islam, Christianity and Judaism, was established in London
in 1997 (Bharat and Bharat 2007, 236).
Several participants in the Netpeace study confirmed these observations, describing how
increased tensions between Islam and the West led to a rise in Muslim involvement in multifaith
activities. Mohammed Abu-Nimer <2008, USA>, Director of the Peacebuilding and Develop-
ment Institute at the American University, Washington DC, explained that growing tensions
between Islamic societies in the Middle East and the USA were becoming apparent in the
1990s, particularly around the time of the First Gulf War. This placed great strain on Muslim–
USA relations, yet at the same time created new possibilities for religious and multifaith
peacebuilding initiatives.
Sherene Hassan <2008, AUS>, Interfaith Officer of the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV),
similarly described how, while there was a rise in anti-Muslim sentiments in Australia in the
1980s and 1990s, around the time of the First Gulf War and the Salman Rushdie fatwa ‘there
were a number of [Muslim] people who took it upon themselves to actually try and start this
whole process of interreligious understanding’ in response to international events. Mehmet
Ozalp <2008, AUS>, Chief Executive Officer of the Affinity Intercultural Foundation (AIF),
also stated that ‘there was a need to get out there and speak, especially in the post-1991 Gulf
War era, [as] it became clear that people didn’t know about Islam, Muslims and that made
them hostile, fearful’. He also explained that, after the end of the Cold War, as Islam replaced
Communism as the new enemy of the West, these provided the impetus for Muslims to
become more active in multifaith movements:
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from the Muslim world perspective it appears that Islam has been replaced as the so-called ‘other’.
Instead of Communism we now have Islam to deal with … the world events and the changes in
global politics coinciding with globalisation, gave Muslims the impression that well they have to
do something about this, they have to respond to these new circumstances that are developing
beyond themselves. And this made Muslims move more open[ly] into interreligious dialogue …
[To] see that we do need to improve the relationships between the religions … in order to have a
peaceful world. <Ozalp 2008, AUS>
Dirk Ficca <2007, USA>, Executive Director of the Council for a Parliament of the World’s
Religions, also confirmed that the Oklahoma City bombing (1995) was a pivotal event that led
to Muslim communities becoming more proactive in multifaith engagement:
the Oklahoma City bombing… totally caught the United States off guard and the first 18 hours of that
or 36 hours, everybody was convinced it was an Islamic terrorist attack, so that kind of discourse was
all over the media and in everybody’s mind and then we found out it was home-grown terrorism. But I
will say that that experience also led religious communities to begin getting to know each other.
<Ficca 2007, USA>
Many participants described how, as a result of this series of events, Muslim communities
became more active in dialogues with Christians and Jews in the 1990s <Braybrooke 2007,
UK; Dupuche 2008, AUS; Jones 2008, AUS; Postma 2008, AUS; Shashoua 2008, UK>. Simi-
larities between the three Abrahamic faiths were said to aid this process, yet histories of conflict
also intensified the need for bridge-building between these communities <Dupuche 2008,
AUS>. It is important to note that many of these activities were conducted as bilateral interfaith
dialogues between Jews and Muslims or Muslims and Christians rather than as multifaith
initiatives. For example, throughout the 1990s and in 2000 and early 2001, discussions took
place between the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the Australian Federation of
Islamic Councils (AFIC) <Jones 2008, AUS>. Similarly, the Victorian Council of Churches
began a dialogue with the Islamic Council of Victoria in the 1990s <Postma 2008, AUS>. In
addition, Muslim communities in Australia began to be more active in initiating Mosque
Open Days in 2001 in response to these events, before the 9/11 terrorist attacks <Ozalp
2008, AUS>. Finally, while dialogue between the Abrahamic faiths was part of vital conflict
resolution and peacebuilding strategies, dialogue between Eastern and Western religions was
described as lacking the same urgency at the end of the twentieth century, while remaining
equally valuable <Dupuche 2008, AUS>.
During the 1990s, Muslim communities were increasingly at the centre of crisis events and
consequently experienced rising discrimination in Western societies. As a result, the focus of multi-
faith activities began to shift to the Abrahamic traditions, as Jewish and Christian actors extended
support to Muslim communities and Muslim peacebuilders began to take a more proactive role in
multifaith initiatives at the turn of the twenty-first century. Throughout the twentieth century, as
crises have occurred in different locations, each new event has led to tensions and fears develop-
ing between different communities. I have labelled this phenomenon ‘othering shifts’,4 as nega-
tive stereotypes and misperceptions abound immediately following a crisis and shift from
community to community, aimed at those who are perpetuating or fleeing the crisis. This pheno-
menon has been documented in Australia, as religious and/or racial vilification has shifted from
Catholic, to Italian and Greek – followed by Vietnamese, Russian, Muslim and now African –
immigrants. Newly arriving communities, often those who are fleeing a crisis in their country
of origin, become the target of the host community’s fears. However, over time, as communities
come to understand one another, and as the focus of international crises shifts, the ethnic group
under pressure becomes gradually accepted by the host society, and fears and prejudices are trans-
ferred to a newly arriving group of immigrants (Lentini, Halafoff, and Ogru 2009, 28, 37). Due to
this process, the focus of multifaith engagement has also shifted accordingly: from Hindu/
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Buddhist communities at the turn of the twentieth century, to Jewish communities after the
Holocaust, back to Buddhist communities in the 1970s when nuclear and peace issues rose to
the fore, to Indigenous communities in the 1990s when environmental crises first featured in
the public mind, to Muslim communities in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Multifaith movements, by shifting their focus to different groups in response to crisis events,
have challenged exclusivist attitudes and countered fears and stereotypes by developing under-
standing between groups that are experiencing these kinds of tensions and/or have particular
wisdom to impart as to how to solve such crises, be they social or environmental. As described
above, during the 1990s this focus shifted to Muslim communities and stayed there until the
global risk of climate change re-emerged in the public mind and began to eclipse the risk of
terrorism in the mid-2000s following the release of Al Gore’s film An inconvenient truth.
While religious resurgence in the form of fundamentalist movements has been well documen-
ted by sociologists and political scientists, these actor perspectives demonstrate that religions have
played a constructive peacebuilding role in ultramodern societies. They also demonstrate that
many of the features that characterize post-9/11 multifaith peacebuilding strategies have long
been present within multifaith movements, and that by the end of the 1990s multifaith movements
were well placed to lead the way in formulating a peacebuilding response to this global crisis
event.
Multifaith responses to 9/11
The multifaith movement has been described as a ‘quiet revolution’ (Gopin 2000, 4; Kirkwood
2007) of ‘mostly unrecognised efforts’ (McCarthy 2007, 2) by diverse religious communities
to create a more peaceful world. However, the events of 9/11 ‘put religion front and centre on
the world stage’, transforming multifaith engagement from ‘merely an academic exercise, or a
spiritual luxury’ into ‘a global imperative, and a global necessity’ (Kirkwood 2007, v–vi).
Three days after 9/11, then-President George Bush called for a national day of mourning,
which was marked throughout the USA by a plethora of multifaith ceremonies. At this
moment, ‘the interfaith movement moved from periphery to centre’ in the American public
mind (Brodeur and Patel 2006, 4). In addition, subsequent to 9/11, multifaith engagement was
identified as a potential strategy to counter religious extremism, which suddenly propelled it to
‘the centre stage of world attention’ (Brodeur 2005, 42; Braybrooke, quoted in Bharat and
Bharat 2007, 225). As a result, the need for management (Bouma 1995, 1999) and/or governance
of religious diversity (Bader 2007) suddenly rose to the top of policy agendas in Western societies
(Eck 2001, xiii). Although 9/11 and the need to counter religiously motivated terrorism created ‘a
new sense of urgency’ for multifaith engagement, it is critical to recognize that this momentum
was building in the multifaith movement well before 2001, particularly during the 1990s, as
described above (Niebuhr 2008, xxii; Smock 2002, 3).
While there was a rise in discrimination aimed largely at Muslim, Sikh and South Asian immi-
grants following the events of 9/11, in multifaith societies such as the USA and Australia, there
was a corresponding increase in interfaith initiatives and educational programmes that reached
across religious boundaries at the local and national level (Eck 2001, xiii–xix; Bouma et al.
2007, 61–6, 106; Kirkwood 2007, v–vi; Niebuhr 2008, 5–7, 10–11). As a result, Kate McCarthy
(2007, 85) described multifaith engagement as becoming an ‘increasingly mainstream phenom-
enon’. The impact of 9/11 was felt far beyond the borders of the USA. According to Rev.
Fergus Capie, while multifaith engagement ‘was often considered “suspect”’ within the
Church of England, after 9/11 ‘[d]ialogue developed teeth’ and suddenly became ‘legitimate’
in the UK (Capie, quoted in Bharat and Bharat 2007, 233–4). More recently, and particularly fol-
lowing the 2005 London bombings, it became ‘“de rigueur”, being even more mainstreamed and
458 A. Halafoff
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
7:4
2 2
1 M
ay
 20
12
 
integrated in the life of society’ (ibid.). A significant growth of multifaith engagement after 9/11
and the 2002 Bali and 2005 London bombings was also reported in Australia (Cahill et al. 2004,
86–8; Bouma et al. 2007, 6, 55, 57–9).
Many participants in the Netpeace study confirmed these developments. According to Rev.
Chloe Breyer <2007, USA>, Executive Director of the Interfaith Centre of New York, the
events of 9/11 put the multifaith movement ‘on a map in a mainstream way that it hadn’t been
before.’ Before 9/11, Simon Keyes <2007, UK>, Director of the St Ethelburga’s Centre for
Reconciliation and Peace, London, noted that ‘it wasn’t a sort of public phenomenon in the
way we see interfaith dialogue now’, and Maureen Postma <2008, AUS>, General Secretary
of the Victorian Council of Churches, recalled that public displays of solidarity between faith
leaders condemning violence immediately following 9/11 increased the visibility of the move-
ment. The events of 9/11 were also described as lending more urgency to multifaith engagement
<Smock 2007, USA; Dellal 2008, AUS> and as intensifying the need for understanding among
diverse communities <Lacey 2008, AUS>. Consequently, multifaith movements gathered
strength <Braybrooke 2007, UK> and a greater awareness of the importance of cooperation
and understanding across faith communities emerged at both the local and global level.
Indeed, Sr Joan Kirby <2007, USA>, the Temple of Understanding’s United Nations Represen-
tative, exclaimed that after 9/11, ‘it’s as if the wave is cresting. There’s such enormous interest in
interfaith dialogue and cooperation’ from the grassroots all the way to the United Nations.
In addition, several participants described 9/11 as a terrible tragedy, but also paradoxically as
an ‘unprecedented opportunity’ to consolidate the earlier efforts of religious peacebuilders
<Ramey 2007, USA> by bringing diverse religious communities closer together to condemn
acts of violence, to renew hope and promote non-violent responses to terrorism <Gibbs 2007,
USA; Knitter 2007, US; Landau 2008, AUS>. These actor perspectives demonstrate that,
while there had already been a substantial rise in multifaith engagement in the late twentieth
century, the events of 9/11 led to a further dramatic increase in multifaith initiatives, at local
and global levels. Those events also lent more urgency and visibility to multifaith movements
and to the positive peacebuilding role of religions. Once again, a devastating tragedy provided
the impetus for increased multifaith engagement, in this case focused primarily on Muslim
communities.
The impact of 9/11 on Muslim communities
As described above, a series of crisis events in the 1990s led to an increase in Muslim community
involvement in multifaith peacebuilding initiatives at the end of the twentieth century that long
preceded 9/11 (Eck 2001, 341–7, 374; Bharat and Bharat 2007, 236); <Braybrooke 2007, UK;
Ficca 2007, USA; Abu-Nimer 2008, USA; Dupuche 2008, AUS; Hassan 2008, AUS; Jones
2008, AUS; Ozalp 2008, AUS; Postma 2008, AUS; Shashoua 2008, UK>. However, these multi-
faith initiatives did not occupy a significant place in the public mind until 9/11, when religion, and
particularly Islam, became the focus of media attention (Sheler 2001, cited in Eck 2001, xvii).
According to Eck, the ‘iconography of inclusion took a quantum leap forward’ (2001, xx)
after these events, as is evident in images of then-President Bush standing with Muslim leaders
at the Massachusetts Avenue Mosque in Washington and meeting with Sikh leaders in the
White House (ibid., xvii–xviii).
Many participants in this study confirmed that Muslim communities suddenly became
‘visible’ after 9/11, thereby heightening awareness of Islam and of Muslims in Western societies
<Ramey 2007, USA; Harper 2008, USA; Shashoua 2008, UK>. According to Ibrahim
Abdil-Mu’id Ramey <2007, USA>, Director of the Human and Civil Rights Division, Muslim
American Society Freedom Foundation:
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9/11 was the incident that didn’t so much define the Muslim community in the United States as make
the Muslim community visible for the first time to millions of people who were not even thinking
about Muslims or only had very peripheral and incidental contact with Muslims. So people literally
discovered that there is a community of 8–9 million people of various racial and ethnic and national
backgrounds living in the United States who are Muslim, so, to the extent 9/11 was kind of a discovery
moment for the majority community in the US, it was an opportunity for Muslims to become visible. It
also became a catalyst for the examination on the part of non-Muslims of the actual text and historical
reality of Islam … there probably were more Qur’ans purchased and exchanged and read by non-
Muslims in the two or three months following 9/11 than probably in any other period in American
history or at least modern American history. <Ramey 2007, USA>
Several participants also recalled that, after 9/11, a new imperative to include Muslim commu-
nities in multifaith activities arose within the multifaith movement <Pearce 2007, UK; Kearns
2008, USA; Postma 2008, AUS>. Many participants described how the false identification of
Islam in public discourse ‘as an enemy of the West’ during this time led to a rise of religious
peacebuilding activities aimed at addressing this misnomer <Abu-Nimer 2008, US; Toh 2008,
AUS>. Faith communities reached out to support Muslim communities and also to develop
greater understanding between their religious traditions, and of Islam in particular <Amatullah
2007, USA; Kearns 2008, USA; Harper 2008, USA; Toh 2008, AUS>. As John O. Voll
<2007, USA>, Associate Director, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim–Christian
Understanding, Georgetown University, explained:
9/11 had two consequences, because there were two general religious responses to 9/11… Now, you
had a very small proportion of the people who felt challenged and threatened going out and harassing
Muslims or attacking mosques and things like that, but that sort of belligerent violent response to
Muslims was very limited, but it was a reflection of the fact that there was a significant proportion
in the society who had … a relatively self-contained exclusivist religious identity who felt that this
was an attack, and that in fact they believed Osama bin Laden, that the attack was part of the great
Islamic jihad against unbelievers … these kind of people tended to … give support, then, to intensi-
fication of homeland security kinds of things. And these are then the people nowadays that if they hear
somebody talking, speaking Arabic on an airplane, they go and tell the pilot and they say, ‘you’ve got
to turn around. We’ve got potential, they make me nervous’, and things like that. On the other hand,
the people coming out of this globalised pluralism, religious resurgence, recognising pluralism, essen-
tially had been aware ‘oh, sure, there are Muslims in America’, but they hadn’t been aware that there
were Muslims down the street from them, and in that context, the other response was to say, ‘I’ve got
to know more about Muslims in general, and I’ve got to know more about my neighbours who are
Muslims’, and so that my experience has been that there has been a qualitatively different number,
a real increase in Christian communities in the United States and Jewish communities who want to
interact with their Muslim neighbours, and Muslims have similarly felt that this is an important
thing, so that 9/11 had the paradoxical, if you will, response of making people feel that they have
to do more to establish a pluralist interfaith identity. <Voll 2007, USA>
Participants also recounted how multifaith initiatives provided a platform for Muslim commun-
ities to differentiate themselves from terrorists, to dispel negative stereotypes of Muslims and
to affirm their commitment to non-violent principles <Mogra 2007, UK; Toh 2008, AUS>.
Muslim organizations were inundated with an unprecedented number of requests for information
about Islam and Muslim communities <Hassan 2008, AUS>. Whereas prior to 9/11, Christian
communities reported difficulty in engaging Muslim communities in multifaith activities, after
the attacks Muslim communities were more willing to take part in multifaith initiatives <Blundell
2008, AUS>. 9/11 was thereby seen as a notable turning point for Muslim multifaith engagement
in that Muslim communities became more proactive in initiating dialogue and educational activi-
ties to dispel misconceptions and to promote the peacebuilding aspects of Islam <Braybrooke
2007, UK; Gibbs 2007, USA; Smock 2007, US; Hassan 2008, AUS; Woodlock 2008, AUS>.
These developments are well illustrated in the comments by Ozalp <2008, AUS> and Bulent
(Hass) Dellal <2008, AUS>, Executive Director, Australian Multicultural Foundation:
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I think there was a lot of interfaith work happening prior to September 11, in the 90s and even before-
hand, but one key difference was that Muslims were not active participants. They were sometimes
invited and they were reactive, they reacted to invitations or sometimes were simply not interested.
For the first time we are seeing probably in modern history that Muslims are really getting into it,
and I think that made a big difference… and we have seen many events, initiatives, programs, projects
being initiated [by Muslims]. <Ozalp 2008, AUS>
we can see what the Muslim community has had to endure over this, but in some of the Muslim
communities [they] have also developed strength out of some of this as well and it’s then an oppor-
tunity… to have more dialogue with other communities and explain Islam to other communities… so
people don’t … have to necessarily live in ignorance, and fear. <Dellal 2008, AUS>
Rachel Woodlock <2008, AUS>, a researcher at the Centre for Islam and the Modern World,
Monash University, also explained that increased participation in multifaith events began to raise
the legitimacy of multifaith engagement within Muslim communities, thus replacing initial fears
and scepticism:
and then of course once people started to do it they weren’t scared by it as much and once one
mosque had an open day, other mosques had open days, and they could see that there were
genuine fruits to come out of this exchange and that kind of led as well … [to a realization that]
we need to do this for our own PR. I think there was a sense that that was a watershed moment
and allowed us to then spread, those of us who think that it’s important activity, we sort of had
some proof against the nay-sayers, saying oh you need to do this, this is important. <Woodlock
2008, AUS>
Moreover, several participants explained that, while the focus within multifaith engagement was
on ‘Islam at the moment’ <Pascoe 2008, AUS>, there were some parallels between Christian–
Jewish relations in the 1950s and 1960s and Christian–Muslim relations in the early 2000s, as
crisis events provided the incentive for the first stage of developing greater understanding
between these communities <Braybrooke 2007, USA>.
The London and Bali bombings
Building upon the growing interest in multifaith engagement after 9/11, an increase in multifaith
initiatives also occurred in the UK and Australia following the 7 July and 21 July 2005 London
bombings (Bouma et al. 2007, 6, 55, 57–9; Braybrooke 2007, 1, 13; Pearce, quoted in Bharat and
Bharat 2007, 245–6; Bouma 2008, 13). Many participants in the Netpeace study confirmed these
assertions <Mogra 2007, UK; Pearce 2007, UK; Cass 2008, UK; Hassan 2008, AUS; Murdoch
2008, UK>. Indeed, Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra <2007, UK>, Chair of the Interfaith Relations Com-
mittee, Muslim Council of Britain, described how Muslim communities and imams became far
more proactive and open to multifaith activities after the 2005 London bombings. While there
had been a new focus on interfaith dialogue between Christians and Muslims and also between
Jews and Muslims in the 1990s, and while the Three Faiths Forum had already been formed in
the UK in 1997, several participants explained that a new emphasis on trialogue between
Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities emerged in the USA, the UK and Australia sub-
sequent to the events of 9/11 and the London bombings <Keyes 2007, UK; Voll 2007, USA;
Jones 2008, AUS>. In addition, participants stated that the ‘home-grown’ nature of the terrorists
involved in the London bombings at once increased fears and prejudices and also provided greater
impetus for multifaith engagement in both the UK and Australia <Cass 2008, UK; Murdoch 2008,
UK; Hassan 2008, AUS>.
Hassan <2008, AUS> reported some setbacks to multifaith engagement between Muslim
communities in Australia after the London bombings. However, participants in the UK and the
USA confirmed that multifaith networks that were well established after 9/11 enabled quicker
and more effective responses to these crisis events <Pearce 2007, UK; Gibbs 2007, USA>, as
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illustrated by the comments of Brian Pearce <2007, UK>, Director of the Inter Faith Network for
the UK:
I think it would be fair to say by July 2005, one of the noticeable aspects of that was that there were
local interfaith structures already in place, so that in many parts of the country, for example, key faith
leaders met together and issued joint declarations and statements in that context. So those structures
were already in place in order to respond to that kind of development. <Pearce 2007, UK>
Australian participants also stated that the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings had a negative effect
on Muslim communities and that multifaith initiatives played a significant role in remedying the
effects of this crisis <Hassan 2008, AUS; Blundell 2008, AUS>.
Increased state involvement in multifaith activities
As briefly described in the introduction, following the UK ‘summer of violence’ in 2001 and the
events of 9/11 a shift in emphasis occurred in national and local government policy, away from
multiculturalism toward ‘social cohesion’. This intensified after the Bali and London bombings,
indicating growing popularity for a more assimilationist approach to managing religious diversity
in the UK and in Australia. Concurrently, these governments increasingly promoted multifaith
engagement, at the local and national level, as a strategy to tackle religious extremism and
promote community and social cohesion (Cahill et al. 2004, 86–8; Braybrooke 2007, 1, 13;
Pearce, quoted in Bharat and Bharat 2007, 245–6; Bouma et al. 2007, 6, 22–6, 55, 57–60; Bouma
2008, 13; Weller 2008, 198–9). Several participants in this study confirmed these observations.
Pearce <2007, UK> explained that the UK ‘summer of violence’ in 2001 was a significant
crisis event that created a new government focus on the need for community cohesion among
diverse cultural and religious groups in the UK and on the role that faith communities could
play in this process. Furthermore, following the events of 9/11 and the London bombings in par-
ticular, the UK Government developed a parallel strand of initiatives aimed at preventing violent
extremism <Pearce 2007, UK>. Participants said that this led to increased state engagement with
religious communities and to a rise in capacity-building funding for multifaith initiatives
<Braybrooke 2007, UK>, particularly after the London bombings <Keyes 2007, UK>. According
to Catriona Laing <2007, UK>, Project Manager of the Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme at the
University of Cambridge, this growth in state support of multifaith engagement resulted in a
plethora of new multifaith organizations ‘cropping up all over the place’.
In addition, many state-supported multifaith initiatives in the UK focused on Muslim commu-
nities with concurrent aims of preventing extremism and helping Muslim communities to counter
prejudices and misunderstandings in the broader community <Braybrooke 2007, UK; Pearce
2007, UK>. Braybrooke <2007, UK> explained that ‘the government is very aware [of issues
facing Muslim communities] but I don’t think it really knows what to do, there’s only so much
you can do from outside’, and that, as a result, ‘Muslim leaders are now taking far more initiative’.
Consequently a new awareness has developed among state actors of the need to work together
with faith communities in response to, and specifically to prevent, crises.
According to Australian participants, the Australian Government similarly increased funding
for multifaith initiatives under its ‘Living in harmony’ community relations grants scheme during
this period <Toh 2008, AUS> as a strategy designed to promote social cohesion <Summers 2008,
AUS> and to counter extremism <Ozalp 2008, AUS>. In addition, the federal government allo-
cated a large portion of its ‘Living in harmony’ grants to initiatives focused on Muslim commu-
nities, and established a Muslim Advisory Board following the events of 9/11 <Jones 2008,
AUS>.
Many participants also recalled that state governments in Australia, especially in Victoria,
Queensland and New South Wales, assumed a stronger interest in religion and the role of
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multifaith initiatives in promoting community harmony after 9/11 <Aly 2008, AUS; Blundell
2008, AUS; Camilleri 2008, AUS; Dellal 2008, AUS; Dupuche 2008, AUS; Hirsh 2008,
AUS; Lacey 2008, AUS; Pascoe 2008, AUS; Postma 2008, AUS; Ozalp 2008, AUS; Toh
2008, AUS>. Victoria was cited as a leader among Australian states in promoting multifaith
relations as part of a broader social inclusion strategy <Pascoe 2008, AUS>, and Victoria
police were praised for prioritizing engagement and cooperation with Muslims <Hassan 2008,
AUS; Ozalp 2008, AUS> and Jewish communities <Hirsh 2008, AUS>.
In the USA, following the events of 9/11, Muslim communities became more active in pol-
itical processes, advising state actors on community issues and uniting with other religious
actors to campaign for common concerns <Ramey 2007, USA>. According to Ramey <2007,
USA>, Muslim communities and organizations in the US increasingly ‘became much more
engaged in dialogue with law enforcement, [and] with government agencies’ after 9/11. They
also became more involved in political processes, collaborating with issues-based organizations
to protest against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and campaigning alongside Christian groups
against nuclear weapons. Ramey <2007, USA> said that these common actions constituted
examples of how ‘cooperation between religions can become part of not only interreligious dia-
logue but also part of a growing consensus for changing the policies of nation-states towards
things that are more peaceful and more just’. In addition, many participants in this study explained
that, subsequent to 9/11, the Bali bombings and especially the London bombings, a new emphasis
on multifaith youth initiatives emerged in the USA, the UK and Australia, with a focus on coun-
tering extremism and home-grown terrorism <Epstein 2007, USA; Mogra 2007, UK; Cass 2008,
AUS; Dellal 2008, AUS; Shashoua 2008, UK; Young 2008, AUS>.
While East–West relations dominated multifaith engagement for much of the late twentieth
century, the rise of religious extremism in the 1990s and particularly the events of 9/11 shifted
the focus of multifaith movements to Jewish–Christian–Muslim relations, broadening the conver-
sation to include more Muslim communities, yet narrowing the focus on Abrahamic faiths (John
D’Arcy May, quoted in Bharat and Bharat 2007, 122). Consequently, as 9/11 shifted much of the
emphasis of multifaith engagement onto countering risks and promoting social cohesion, the theo-
logical and philosophical underpinnings of multifaith initiatives were somewhat marginalized in
the early twenty-first century (Braybrooke 2007, 25). Finally, Abu-Nimer <2008, USA> offered a
pertinent reminder that funding comes in cycles, shifting from issue to issue, and that while multi-
faith networks have recently received an increase in state-funded support in response to risks such
as terrorism, this was likely to change over time.
Conclusions
These actor perspectives demonstrate that religion came to occupy a prominent place in the public
mind in the early 2000s, largely as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent 2002
Bali and 2005 London bombings. Multifaith initiatives also suddenly became more visible as they
were increasingly implemented as peacebuilding and counter-terrorism strategies in Western
multifaith societies, to counter the negative impact of these crisis events. While multifaith
initiatives have no doubt received more public recognition since 9/11, networks of trust across
faith communities were already well established in multifaith movements in the 1990s.
The tragedy of 9/11, as with previous crisis events such as World War II and the Cold War,
served as a stimulus for a plethora of multifaith activities in the USA, the UK and Australia. Exist-
ing multifaith networks, many of which were founded in the 1990s, were well placed to respond
to this event. These multifaith peacebuilding responses to 9/11, particularly evident at the grass-
roots, community-based level, challenged direct and structural violence within religious traditions
and in broader society. Consequently, religious peacebuilders from diverse faith traditions joined
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together to condemn acts of violence; to call for more equitable distribution of power, resources
and privileges; to affirm the positive aspects of religions; and to counter negative stereotypes of
religious communities, thereby propelling multifaith initiatives into the public sphere.
At the grassroots level, numerous initiatives occurred spontaneously and independently as
communities reached out to one another for support and to develop greater understanding. More-
over, there is no doubt that 9/11 made Islam and Muslim communities more visible in Western
multifaith societies. Initially, the focus was negative and fear and prejudice abounded.
However, many Muslim communities, supported by other faith communities, countered negative
stereotypes and condemned violent extremism through the platform of multifaith initiatives,
which also provided opportunities to develop understanding and relationships between adherents
of diverse religious traditions. The London bombings, as a consequence of their ‘home-grown’
nature, placed even greater importance on the need to better understand and build bridges
across divided communities, especially with youths, who were viewed as those principally at
risk of radicalization. Multifaith initiatives for young people became increasingly viewed as
counter-terrorism strategies, and multifaith engagement in general was promoted as part of com-
munity and social cohesion strategies in Western multifaith societies such as the UK and
Australia.
In addition, in response to crisis events such as 9/11, the ‘summer of violence’ in the UK,
and the Bali and London bombings, collaboration between state and religious actors increased
in order to combat local and global risks and to advance mutual security. The emphasis on
social cohesion and countering extremism in Australia and the UK, especially after the London
bombings, raised the profile of multifaith initiatives and gave new legitimacy to the multifaith
movement. Consequently, multifaith initiatives received support funding from states and foun-
dations as part of counter-terrorism strategies and increasingly included conservative as well as
liberal actors. It was primarily for this reason that the multifaith movement continued to grow
during this period.
Thus, the actor perspectives provided above substantiate my theory that the multifaith move-
ment has been highly responsive to global risks, and also that the focus of crises, and conse-
quently of peacebuilding initiatives, has shifted over time. The participants’ accounts also
provide further evidence that the impact of global risks and corresponding ‘othering’ has
shifted from community to community, as has the need to provide support to communities at
risk or under pressure during times of crisis, in this case, to Muslim communities following
the events of 9/11. However, concerns have also been raised that the increased focus on security
has lessened the focus on the theological and philosophical underpinnings of multifaith initiatives
in the twenty-first century, and that Eastern and Indigenous communities came to be largely
excluded from multifaith movements in the early 2000s.
As it is 10 years since 11 September 2001, and as the multifaith movement has more recently
shifted its focus away from the global risk of terrorism towards the global risk of climate change,
as was evident in the 2009 Parliament of World’s Religions, it appears that multifaith initiatives
may have reached their peak in terms of the funding cycle. However, as state actors in Western
societies have increasingly recognized the peacebuilding capacity of religions, particularly after
9/11, I argue that they are now more likely to continue to collaborate with religious actors
in response to current and future risks such as environmental and economic crises. The recent
establishment of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation in the UK and the Center for Faith Based
and Community Initiatives in the USA offers some evidence to support this assertion.
The Netpeace study investigated how multifaith initiatives have been implemented as peace-
building strategies to counter global risks – such as terrorism and climate change – and to advance
mutual security in ultramodern Western societies. While the observation that ‘it takes networks to
fight networks’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 15) achieved almost axiomatic status in much
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contemporary scholarship on counter-terrorism that emerged during the Bush and Howard eras, I
argue that ‘netpeace’ is a preferable option to ‘netwar’ for countering global risks such as terror-
ism and climate change. The concept of ‘netpeace’ acknowledges the interconnectedness of
global problems and solutions, and particularly the capacity of critical and collaborative networks,
including state, non-state and religious actors co-committed to the common good, to solve the
world’s most pressing problems. The development of multifaith and multi-actor peacebuilding
networks lends itself to ‘netpeace’ – to an optimistic and practical vision – whereby seeking
mutual understanding and enabling non-violent critique will increase equitable participation in
responsible local and global governance.
While a detailed account of the Netpeace framework, the aims, benefits and challenges of
multifaith movements and their role in countering terrorism, is unfortunately beyond the scope
of this article, it has presented a summary of findings from the Netpeace study pertaining to
Muslim communities in particular and, in so doing, has demonstrated that multifaith movements
provided an effective platform for Muslim communities, in partnership with other religious
communities and state actors, to counter Islamophobia and to advance peacebuilding principles
within and beyond their faith traditions at the turn of the twenty-first century.
Netpeace participants
The following expert professionals who participated in the Netpeace study have been cited in this paper.
Their affiliation, at the time of the interview, is provided below:
Prof. Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Director, Peacebuilding and Development Institute, International
Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, School of International Service, American University,
Washington DC, USA.
Waleed Aly. Lecturer, Global Terrorism Research Centre, School of Social and Political Inquiry,
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
Nurah Amatullah. Executive Director of the Muslim Women’s Institute for Research and
Development, New York, USA.
Dr Patricia Blundell. Coordinator Chaplaincy, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.
Rev. Dr Chloe Breyer. Executive Director, Interfaith Center of New York, New York, USA.
Rev. Professor Marcus Braybrooke. President, World Congress of Faiths, Oxford, UK.
Prof. Joseph Camilleri. Director, Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia.
Josh Cass, Youth Worker, Encounter, London, UK.
Dr Bulent (Hass) Dellal. Executive Director, Australian Multicultural Foundation, Melbourne,
Australia.
Fr Dr John Dupuche. Chair, Catholic Interfaith Committee of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia.
Greg M. Epstein. Humanist Chaplain at Harvard University, Cambridge MA, USA.
Rev. Dirk Ficca. Executive Director, Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions, Chicago,
USA.
Rev. Charles Gibbs. Executive Director, United Religions Initiative, San Francisco, USA.
Rev. Fletcher Harper. Executive Director, GreenFaith, New Brunswick, USA.
Sherene Hassan. Interfaith Officer, Islamic Council of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia.
Di Hirsh. Interfaith and Intercultural Chair, National Council of Jewish Women of Australia,
Melbourne, Australia.
Jeremy Jones. Co-Chair of the Australian National Dialogue of Christians, Muslims and Jews,
Sydney, Australia.
Assoc. Prof. Laurel Kearns. Associate Professor, Sociology of Religion and Environmental
Studies, Drew Theological School and Graduate Division of Religion, Drew University,
Madison WI, USA.
Simon Keyes. Director, St Ethelburga’s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace, London, UK.
Sr Joan Kirby. United Nations Representative, Temple of Understanding, New York, USA.
Prof. Paul F. Knitter. Paul Tillich Professor of Theology, World Religions and Culture, Union
Theological Seminary, New York, USA.
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Josie Lacey. Convener, Women’s Interfaith Network, Sydney, Australia.
Catriona Laing. Project Manager of the Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme, Faculty of Divinity,
University of Cambridge, UK.
Melanie Landau. Lecturer in Jewish Studies, Australian Centre for Jewish Civilization, School of
Historical Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra. Chair, Interfaith Relations Committee, Muslim Council of Britain,
London, UK.
Alison Murdoch. Director, Foundation for Developing Compassion and Wisdom, London, UK.
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Notes
1. The 1893 Parliament of the World’s Religions (PWR) was originally titled the World’s Parliament of
Religions (WPR). The Council for the Parliament of the World’s Religions (CPWR) was established
to coordinate the 1993 PWR and future PWRs. CPWR is now simply called the Parliament of the
World’s Religions (PWR). I have used Parliament of the World’s Religions (PWR) throughout this
article to describe all WPR, CPWR and PWR events in order to avoid confusion.
2. The 1993, PWR, commonly described as the second PWR, was actually the third. The second, much
smaller, PWR was held in Chicago in 1933, convened by the World Fellowship of Faiths (WFF)
(Braybrooke 1992, 39).
3. A detailed explanation of my research methodology can be found in my PhD thesis (Halafoff 2010) and
in forthcoming publications arising from the Netpeace study.
4. I first described this phenomenon when I was on an untitled panel at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism in Melbourne, 19–20 October 2007.
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